In 2010. Weaver's Needle is in the background. It is a thousand foot volcanic plug
in the Superstition Wilderness Area.

Thomas A. Blackson

Philosophy Faculty
Lattie F. Coor Hall, 3356
School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ. 85287-4302

blackson@asu.edu, tab.faculty.asu.edu, www.public.asu.edu/~blackson
curriculum vitae

Intellectual Biography

I was born in Havre de Grace, Maryland. I went to college in the Midwest. When I graduated, I wasn't sure what to do. I decided to move to Cambridge, since some friends were moving there. I worked in computers, first at Instrumentations Laboratories and later at MIT. After a few years, I took a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. My first academic jobs were visiting positions. I was a Visiting Assistant Professor, at North Carolina State University for two years and at Arizona State University for two years. My first permanent position was at Temple University. After three years, I was awarded tenured and promoted to Associate Professor of Philosophy. I never much liked living in the East, and so I took a reduction in rank and returned to Arizona State University when a permanent job became available. (Arizona is beautiful, and in those days there was more desert and fewer people. Plus, I had made friends in Tempe.) Two years later, I was tenured and promoted to Associate Professor for a second time.

Research

My research interests are primarily in ancient philosophy and in epistemology and other issues connected to artificial intelligence and rationality.

Recent Work

Ancient Greek Philosophy: From the Presocratics to the Hellenistic Philosophers. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

In this book, I set out an interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy in terms of a line of thought in which the thinking or cognition in expertise is understood to be a matter of "reason" as opposed to "experience." This idea is in Parmenides and some of the Pluralists, especially Democritus and the Atomists. And the line of thought, as I understand it, runs though Socrates' love of wisdom and its connection to the soul. It is central to the Tripartite Theory of the Soul and the otherworldly perspective that seems so prominent in Plato's traditionally middle and late dialogues. It continues in Aristotle, in his distinction between first and second philosophy, in his psychology, and in his ethics and understanding of the best life for human beings. The line of thought continues in the Hellenistic philosophers. Epicurus and the Epicureans take some of the first steps to move away from the rationalism of the classical tradition. They seem to try to work out some form of empiricism. The Stoics continue the rationalist line in a modified form, and the Academic and Pyrrhonian Skeptics seem to reject the distinction altogether.

Two Interpretations of Socratic Intellectualism" (new version of work in progress)

Socratic intellectualist psychology has been understood in at least two ways. On one way (the A interpretation), all action is a matter of a fixed desire for the good and belief about what the good is. On another interpretation (the B interpretation), all action is completely a matter of belief. I argue for the B interpretation. As such, this paper makes good on endnote 12 on page 68 in Ancient Greek Philosophy where I endorse the B interpretation without much argument.

"Epicureanism." The History of Evil, Volume 1: The History of Evil in Antiquity (2000BCE-450CE), edited by Tom Angier. Acumen Press. Forthcoming.

Epicurus does not discuss evil as theological problem, a problem that the recognition of free will is sometimes thought to solve. Only a small part of Epicurus= voluminous work has survived, at least in part because his philosophy was unappealing during the resurgence of non-skeptical forms of Platonism in late antiquity. Nevertheless, contrary to the suggestions of some of his commentators, these texts provide little reason to think that he believed in free will. This concept seems to enter the philosophical tradition in late Stoicism. Further, these texts provide even less reason to think that Epicurus believed in a god whose existence evil could call into question. They show that he did not believe in a providentially ordered world, but they also show that he did believe that false beliefs about the gods are a prominent source of unhappiness and that human beings are particularly prone to such beliefs and to superstition generally. This is where Epicurus makes an important contribution to understanding evil and its causes. He was interested in the practical problem of living well, and his discussion of goods and evils is part of his solution to this problem. He rejected the line of thought from the classical tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Epicurus was an empiricist, not a rationalist. From within this perspective, he came to a different set of conclusions about human beings and their place in reality. He thought that the life of enlightened moderation is the good life and that contemplation is not essential to happiness. This philosophy of life would not be popular as the critical reaction of Hellenistic philosophy to the prior classical tradition gave way to the resurgence of Platonism and the subsequent rise and domination of Christianity.

"Extrinsic Attitudinal Pleasure." Philosophical Studies. Forthcoming.

I argue for an alternative interpretation of some of the examples Fred Feldman uses to establish his theory of happiness (Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford University Press, 2004) and What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford University Press, 2010)). According to Feldman, the examples show that certain utterances of the form 'S is pleased/glad that P' and 'S is displeased/sad that P' should be interpreted as expressions of extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and hence must be excluded from the aggregative sum of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure that constitutes happiness. I develop a new interpretation of Feldman's examples. This interpretation allows the attitudinal hedonist to preserve the idea that happiness is simply a matter of the attutidinal pleasure and displeasure in one's life and that all attitudinal pleasure and displeasure counts equally in the aggregation that constitutes happiness.

"Early Work on Rationality: the Lorenz-Frede Interpretation." History of Philosophy Quarterly, 27 (2010), 101-124.

In The Brute Within (Oxford University Press, 2006), Hendrik Lorenz tries to incorporate Plato's Triparitite Theory of the Human Soul within the framework of the ancient Rationalist/Empiricist tradition that Michael Frede has outlined in series of papers. To correct what I believe is a mistake in Lorenz's interpretation, I consider certain passages in the Gorgias in which Socrates discusses the kind of cognition he calls "experience." I argue that these passages strongly suggest that Plato, in the Republic, in the tripartite theory, allows for action to be completely a matter of the appetite and spirit, with reason playing no role whatsoever. Further, given my interpretation of the tripartite theory, I note that there is a clear connection between Plato's work in understanding the Socratic claim that human beings are psychological beings and contemporary work in philosophical psychology according to which cognitive behavior can be rational even though no part of this behavior depends on an instance of reasoning. Plato was the pioneer, and Lorenz's interpretation unnecessarily obscures this fact.

"On Feldman's Theory of Happiness." Utilitas, 21 (2009), 393-400.

In Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford University Press, 2004), Fred Feldman argues that there is a propositional attitude (he calls "attitudinal pleasure/displeasure") expressed in ordinary uses of sentences of the form 'S is pleased/displeased that P.' He distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure, and he excludes extrinsic attitudinal pleasure/displeasure from the aggregation of attitudinal pleasure/displesure that constitutes happiness. I argue that Feldman has not made a strong case for this distinction and exclusion.

"On Williamson's Argument for (I_i) in his Anti-luminosity Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74 (2007), 397-405.

Williamson's anti-luminosity argument depends on what he says is an "intuitive" connection between knowledge and reliability. (Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000), 100.) I believe that the connection is "intuitive," although this can take some time to see, but I argue that this "intuitive" connection is not sufficient to support (I_i) in his anti-luminosity argument. The defender of luminosity can affirm that knowledge is reliable in the way Williamson maintains, and so Williamson's argument against luminosity fails.

"Induction and Experience in Metaphysics A1." Review of Metaphysics, 59 (2006), 541-552.

Aristotle, as I understand him, tries to free Platonic rationalism from a confused ontology. He rejects the Pythagorean ontology of soul and body in which Plato had cast his rationalism. Reason is not inborn, according to Aristotle. Rather, reason and its knowledge naturally become present over time in the process of "induction." The question I address is how Aristotle understood "experience" when he says, in specifying induction in Metaphysics A1 and in II.19 of the Posterior Analytics, that knowledge comes through experience. My answer is contrary to the one Michael Frede gives in his "Aristotle's Rationalism" (Rationality in Greek Thought (edited by Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (Oxford University Press, 1996)), 157-173). I argue that the experience that underlies the expertise of the practitioner, e.g., the medical practitioner, is not the state of mind in the inductive process that precedes and gives rise to reason and its knowledge. The experience in induction is a state that characterizes the soul early in its natural development. The experience of a practitioner comes late in the life of an adult, if at all, and its presence is over and above the knowledge that belongs to reason. On my view, but not Frede's, Plato and Aristotle both thought that the knowledge essential to reason is in the human adult as long as he or she is not maimed or otherwise defective. (I no longer have as much confidence in the argument of this paper as I had when I wrote it. For my present view, see Ancient Greek Philosophy, 178-181.)

"In Defense of an Unpopular Interpretation of Ancient Skepticism." Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy: History of Epistemology, 8 (2005), 68-81.

The subject of this paper is the history of late Academic Skepticism and its connection to the emergence of Pyrrhonian Skepticism. The two main ways to understand this period in history are anthologized The Original Sceptics: A Controversy (Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), edited by Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede. Frede's position in this book has been less convincing to many than Burnyeat's position. Unlike Burnyeat and others, Frede argues that life without belief was not a fundamental feature of Pyrrhonism. Frede presents his arguments somewhat confusingly, which has made his interpretation difficult to appreciate. I argue that there is more to be said for Frede's interpretation than has been thought. I argue that Frede's interpretation, when properly understood, shows that the ancient skeptics in the Clitomachian-Pyrrhonian tradition are fallibilists who took the first steps in working out the view that epistemic justification is a matter of whether a belief is the outcome of a correct cognitive process and that correctness here need not be understood in terms of a reliable connection to truth.

"An Invalid Argument for Contextualism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (2004), 344-345.

In "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context" (Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2 (April 2002), 167-203), Keith DeRose offers the following argument for contexualism: "The knowledge account assertion provides a powerful argument for contextualism: if the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly assert that P are the same as those what comprise a truth-condition for 'I know P,' then if the former vary with context, so do the latter. In short: The knowledge account of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertability yields contextulaism about knowlege." (187.) I show that this argument is invalid. This paper is published with a response from DeRose.

Service to the Profession

I am the Book Symposium Editor for Philosophical Studies. Book symposiums are a regular occurrence in the journal. The current one is devoted to Mark Schroeder's Slaves of Passion. I am always looking for interesting books to feature in future symposiums. If you have a suggestion, e-mail me.

Undergraduate and Graduate Teaching

Fall 2009

PHI 301: History of Ancient Philosophy.
PHI 315: Philosophy of Language. An introduction to computational semantics within a philosophical framework that stresses the connection of logic to computation and knowledge representation.

Spring 2010. Sabbatical

Summer 2010

PHI 301: History of Ancient Philosophy.
PHI 333: Introduction to Symbolic Logic.

Fall 2010

PHI 301: History of Ancient Philosophy.
PHI 420/591: Topics in Philosophy. Philosophy of Mathematics. A survey of three contemporary philosophies of mathematics: logicism, intuitionism, and finitism. No special training in mathematics required, just a deep interest in philosophy.

Spring 2011

PHI 312: Theory of Knowledge. A study of epistemology within the context of a theory of rationality.
PHI 319: Philosophy of Computing. An introduction to AI in a computational framework.

Summer 2011

PHI 301: History of Ancient Philosophy.
PHI 333: Introduction to Symbolic Logic. A study of elementary symbolic techniques used to represent knowledge. The emphasis throughout is on understanding, not drill, which I regard as having limited value.

Fall 2011

PHI 301: History of Ancient Philosophy. T, Th, 1:30-2:45. SHESC340.
PHI 420/591: Topics in Philosophy: Free Will in Ancient Thought. This is an investigation into the issue of Free Will in ancient Philosophy and ancient thought more generally. The reading consists in selections (in translation) from the ancient texts, together with certain works of the historian Michael Frede, primarily his Sather Classical Lectures, now published as A Free Will. Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, University of California Press, 2011. T, 3:30-6:20. COOR3323.

Spring 2012

PHI 312: Theory of Knowledge. Questions about knowledge, in connection with philosophical thought experiments and in connection with practical rationality.
PHI 319: Philosophy of Computing. An introduction to AI in a computational framework.

Summer 2012

PHI 301: History of Ancient Philosophy.
PHI 333: Introduction to Symbolic Logic. A study of elementary symbolic techniques used to represent knowledge. The emphasis throughout is on understanding, not drill, which I regard as having limited value.